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Against Youth Justice and Youth Governance, For Youth Penality 
 
Introduction 
 
“Social science creates its own objects by a process of theoretical and practical 
relevances and reflections. ... An important impetus behind the work … has been the 
possibility to talk of alternative social arrangements – that the prime reason for 
investigating the social is the desire to change it. In this sense, all social reflection … 
is a type of political calculation that imagines certain effects.” (Garland and Young 
1983: 2) 
 
Theorising ‘youth justice’ in England and Wales is in a bit of a gloomy state in that 
contemporary responses to youthful lawbreaking have been reduced to and explained away as 
part of an on-going neoliberal government project and/or a managerialist revolution that 
started in the late 1990’s. As this article will discuss, the account develops like this: New 
Labour’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998) swept away the ‘old youth justice’, its 
professional knowledge base, its occupational cultures, its diverse ways of working with 
young people and its adherence to the welfare principle in dealing with children. What came 
in its stead was a new managed national system for governing troublesome youths via penal 
repression: one that fetishized risk assessment, was heavily audited and was staffed by a 
deprofessionalised workforce working to a set of performance targets that utterly curtailed 
discretionary professional judgement.  It was claimed that in shifting the purpose of 
intervention to managing risky populations and preventing re-offending, New Labour's ‘new’ 
youth justice system fundamentally ruptured the relationship between how we deal with 
youth crime (i.e. the processes, procedures and provisions) and why we do it (i.e any higher 
philosophical or ethical goals).  The gloomy part: because of that rupture, attempts to reform 
youth justice in England and Wales, including its custodial estate, will be eventually co-opted 
into the service of the on-going neoliberal revolution that spawned the CDA 1998 and 
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subsequent reforms – despite what appear more recently to be green shoots of a progressive 
turn in youth justice practices (Goshe 2014, Smith 2014). Within youth criminology there has 
developed alongside this expository tale a critical politics of youth justice broadly based on 
the assumption that, as currently constituted, youth justice is unjust. To make it more just, it 
would be necessary to revive and re-institutionalise the relationship between higher ethical 
principles of intervening in young lawbreakers’ lives and what we then do to them (i.e. 
intentions and deeds). These principles can be summarised as: responses to youthful 
lawbreaking should not cause harm to children and young people (and especially should not 
be deleterious, as is currently the case for many young people (McAra and McVie 2015), 
should be child-centred and based on the best interests of the child, should take account of 
children’s welfare needs and should protect children’s rights as per the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR). In 
practice these principles translate to the following political calls: to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility (i.e. a push towards decriminalisation of some youthful lawbreakers), to end 
youth incarceration, to refashion our current youth justice system into one that focuses on 
outcomes rather than processes, is based on minimum system contact and maximum 
diversion and above all else ensures that children’s developmental, social and welfare needs 
are met (Goldson and Muncie 2015). What remains curiously underdeveloped from this list, 
however, is the call for a non-penal response to youthful lawbreaking and by that I mean a 
response that is not targeted at the penal correction of individual young people or framed by 
and within the penal realm of criminal justice. It can be argued that, this absence is, at least in 
part, caused by the way our current analytical tools close off the possibility of addressing two 
related issues. At the level of theory, the issue is one of conceptualising ‘change’. The 
question: what framework would enable us to delineate the necessary and sufficient 
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conditions of possibility for a more just or even a non-penal response to youthful 
lawbreaking. At the political level, the issue is of imagining what such a response would be. 
Across the field of youth justice, there seems to be a gathering wind of change. At the 
level of local practice there is an expansion of diversionary schemes. At the level of central 
government practice there are now far fewer targets by which youth offending teams are held 
to account and remaining targets that are focused on producing system contraction. At the 
level of political discourse questions are being raised about the ‘fitness of purpose’ of the 
system (see Carlile 2014). At the level of practice, there are two stories coming up from the 
ground (Phoenix 2014, Armitage, Kelly and Phoenix, forthcoming, see also evidence given in 
Carlile 2014 and Kelly and Armitage 2014). The first is a narrative in which the increased 
diversity of responses to youthful lawbreaking has been attributed to youth offending teams, 
the police and local authorities being more able to fashion a locally relevant response. The 
second about how the dramatic drops in the numbers of young people coming into the youth 
justice for the first time has been caused by local police constabularies and youth offending 
teams working together to decrease the criminalisation of young people and divert them away 
from youth justice. Sitting underneath both stories is a latent recognition that ‘unnecessary’ 
criminalisation of young people has deleterious effect on their future lives. Yet, as will be 
demonstrated, current theoretical models tend to reduce the diversity and complexity of what 
is done as well as render irrelevant what is said about what is being done (i.e. the connection 
between deeds and words). Hence, what provoked me to write this article was the recognition 
that, at an empirical level, important shifts in practice seem to be occurring that, at the 
theoretical level, cannot be accounted for and, at the political level, cannot be assessed. As 
this article will show, fundamental questions are not capable of being fully addressed. Has 
‘the system’ become ‘more just’, less ‘unjust’ because it diverts more young people and 
incarcerates less?  
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The main aim of this article therefore is not to analyse youth justice policy or work, 
but to provoke a debate and suggest a framework within which we might find our way out of 
the doldrums that marks current thinking about ‘youth justice’ – at the levels of theory, 
practice and politics. One of the main contentions of this article is that the gloomy state of 
theorising is attributable to the ways in which the field (‘youth justice’1) has been 
theoretically constituted within academic discourse and specifically within the ‘youth 
governance’ and the ‘youth justice system’ theoretical frameworks. To substantiate that 
contention, this article analyses both of these frameworks with reference to the domain 
assumptions made and the theoretical closures produced.  From there I go on to suggest a 
critical youth penality which I will claim does have more analytical reach and can provide the 
basis on which to construct a youth ‘penal’ politics that argues for a non-penal response to 
youthful lawbreaking.  
Two specific arguments are made. Firstly, the two dominant approaches described 
here as ‘youth crime governance’ and the ‘youth justice studies’ whilst both critical of the 
justice meted out to young people, nevertheless remain (at the level of theory) wedded to both 
official political discourse on youth offending and to the political project of a youth justice 
system and for these reasons they struggle to conceive of the conditions which could enable a 
way of dealing with young lawbreakers which is other than penal (that is to say practices that 
occur mainly within criminal justice and are framed by notions of punishment). Part of this 
argument is made up of a critique of governmentality that exists outside the subfield of youth 
                                                          
1 One of the challenges in opening different theoretical spaces viz-a-viz young people and punishment is a 
challenge of language. To call this field of analysis ‘youth justice’ is to always and already invoke a number of 
problematic assumptions – such as the relationship between youth crime and the punishment of young 
people, or indeed, that ‘youth justice’ is not about punishing young people but doing something else. Many 
of these issues will be discussed later in the article. In advance of that discussion, I shall use inverted commas 
to simultaneously denote that field of practices and social relations that are about the punishment of young 
people and that the term is problematic. 
5 | P a g e  
justice in “Against Youth Governance” I outline this in relation to the specificities of youth 
justice. The other part of this argument is made in the section entitled “Against Youth Justice” 
which critiques the reification (in theory) of current institutional and organisational 
configurations of the youth penal realm in England and Wales and the policy and state 
determinism that marks this approach. Secondly, I argue in the final section (“For A Critical 
Youth Penality”) that a turn to critical youth penality, along with the abandoning the concept 
of ‘youth justice’ provides a framework that opens the space for new questions to be asked 
and with that for an analysis of the conditions for creating a more ‘just’ way of dealing with 
youthful lawbreaking. 
 
Against Youth Governance 
 
Since its inception, ‘the new youth justice’ (Goldson 2000) has attracted a range of academic 
criticisms: that youth justice policy is confused and contradictory (Muncie 1999, 2006, 2008); 
that it is not held together by any ‘consolidating principles’ (Goldson 2006, Goldson and 
Muncie 2006, Smith 2005); and, that youth justice has been excessively politicised and thus 
youth justice policy is vulnerable to the whims of politicians and populist calls for 
punishment (Smith 2007, 2011, Pitts 2001a, 2001b). The theoretical questions that seemed to 
preoccupy academics for the better part of the last decade and a half were simple enough: 
how can we account for this ‘new youth justice system’, its hybridity, its contradictory policy 
landscape, the seeming abrogation of welfare principle in relation to children, its punitive 
characteristics and its effects. The answer: by using a governmental, penal governance or 
youth governance approach. Hence, Muncie (1999, 2006, 2008), Goldson (2010), Haines 
(2009), Smith (2011), Haines and Case (2008), Kemshall (2008, 2010), Gray (2005, 2007, 
2009, 2013) and a host of others drew on a range of Foucauldian-inspired governmentality 
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conceptual tools. They deconstructed political rhetoric and policy and analyzed how and in 
what ways and under what conditions ever wider populations of risky and offending young 
people were being both drawn into the net of youth justice and increasingly ‘responsibilised’ 
for their misdeeds (Gray 2007, 2009), or, alternatively subjectified under new knowledge 
regimes of risk (Haines and Case 2008, Paylor 2011). In a similar fashion, researchers took to 
task both the evidence base upon which the new system rested, especially the risk factor 
prevention paradigm (Haines and Case 2008) and the noted punitive effects on young people 
of managerialism with its targets, performance monitoring and systems of audit (Morgan 
2008, 2009). They demonstrated how the combination of youth crime governance alongside 
the dominance of managerialist audit and risk obsession and the political mantra of 
intervention, intervention, intervention contributed to a massive net-widening effect drawing 
ever more young people into the (punitive) reach of this ‘new youth governance’ (Smith 
2011). Sitting underneath many of these analyses was the (often implicit) recognition that 
specific ideological conditions in the 1990s provided the impetus for the changes witnessed.  
Namely, following the Audit Commission’s report Misspent Youth (Audit Commission 1996), 
‘youth crime’ was constituted as THE crime problem and ‘young offenders’ as the threatening 
outsider to the modern and modernising project of New Labour (see also McLaughlin, 
Muncie and Hughes 2001).  
Yet, as attractive as this framework is for understanding ‘the new youth justice’, it is 
not without its difficulties. Firstly, bridging the gaps between the grand theorising of 
governmentality and the sheer variability and diversity of what happens on the ground under 
the name of youth justice raises questions about the utility of the perspective. For Pitts (2009) 
the youth governance framework struggles to see how and in what ways some of the 
interventions done in the name of governance do, in fact, govern young people in the ways 
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suggested (i.e. in either a punitive fashion or in terms of producing prudentialised, risk 
calculating citizen subjects).  
Secondly, and relatedly, there is some debate about the extent to which actuarialism 
and risk thinking did penetrate the everyday working practices of youth justice particularly in 
relation to youth courts and young people themselves (Field 2007, Phoenix 2010, Phoenix 
and Kelly 2013). At least at the level of empirical analysis, it would seem that older 
discourses of welfare and care have not been displaced for many of the social actors, 
professionals and practitioners working within the youth justice system.   
Thirdly, there are the general problems associated with a governmental perspective.  
As noted by Carlen (2002), McKee (2009a, 2009b) and Stenson (2005) studies in 
governmentality are precisely that – studies in which the object of analysis is governmentality 
and as such many governmentality studies are functionalist and totalising in their logic. What 
this means is that current youth justice practices and policies are analyzed in relation to how 
and in what ways they contribute to, or are just another part of, the ongoing neo-liberal 
project of reordering the social in ever changing, precarious and insecure social, economic 
and political conditions (Phoenix and Kelly 2013). Such a perspective becomes totalising 
because the logic produces an analysis whereby regardless of the intentions of politicians and 
policy makers, the actions of practitioners, the organisational configuration of youth justice or 
the broader economic, ideological or social conditions, each practice or policy has the effect 
of bringing more and more at risk, risky, troublesome and troubled youths closer into the 
subjectifying processes of governance and more public services subjected to market logics (as 
an example, please see Richards 2014).  
Fourthly, and importantly for the purpose of this article, a governmentality framework 
closes off the theoretical space to analyse the conditions in which change is possible. This is 
because changes or contradictions in the trajectory of policy and practice (i.e. those that are 
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not easily understood as being aligned to neo-liberal governmentality) have been 
conceptualised as a by-product of the never quite complete project of governance. So, for 
instance, Rose’s (2000) notion of governing-at-a-distance has been used to prise open a space 
for situational analyzes of both the variability of criminal justice practices that exist across 
the country as well as the gaps that exist between policy, rhetoric and actual practices. Thus, 
and in relation to last decade’s New Labour Community Safety agenda, Stenson (2005) and 
in relation to youth justice Kemshall (2008) and Gray (2013) demonstrated that any project of 
governmentality is by nature contingent because the realities of political agency at the local 
and regional level, and the inherent bargaining, negotiating and settlements made within 
multi-agency partnership mean that no specific political outcome is assured.   
Contingent, contested, volatile as government may be, and again for the purposes of 
this article, the theoretical space for analysing the conditions of change remains closed off. 
Introducing contingency does not displace the teleological or functionalist logic. Instead of 
being constituted as absolute, governmentality is constituted as always in an emergent state. 
It is always and already in process. The revolution is permanent. Thus, by definition, it is not 
possible to conceive of a state response to youthful lawbreaking (which within the 
governmentality framework is conceived as being part of the governmental project) that is 
beyond or outside governance.  All change to practices and policies will, ultimately, become 
subsumed into governance because youth justice itself is subsumed with governance. It 
logically follows, therefore,  that if the current unjust configuration of youth justice is 
accounted for as a process of youth governance, then at the level of theory it is impossible to 
distinguish or analyze the necessary or sufficient conditions in which a more just response 
could be established, much less imagine what the contours of that response might be.  
There is a further difficulty posed by the governmentality framework. One of the long 
standing challenges of social theorising is how to account for any gaps that appear between 
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what social actors claim about what they do and what is actually done – or to put it more 
succinctly, the gap between intentions and action (see also Cohen 1983 and Carlen 2002). In 
relation to youth justice, and as noted in the introduction, there are emerging practice-based 
stories about progressive changes driven by practitioners (i.e. social actors) in doing youth 
justice work. There are also on-going narratives about the impact and effects of 
managerialism on how youth offending team workers, in particular, do their job (Phoenix 
2010, Phoenix and Kelly 2013). However, a governmentality frame of reference deals with 
the gap between intentions and actions by simply bracketing off the issue of intentions and 
instead focusing on the mentalities and rationalities of governing. When applied to a 
substantive field, this means that the space is closed off in which to ask whether, how and to 
what extent social actors have a role to play in producing change. So, within the youth 
governance framework, these narratives about change are rendered less relevant than political 
rhetoric and therefore the space is foreclosed in which to use them to understand what their 
role may be in the politics of institutional change.  
In the end, the governmentality framework when applied to youth justice ultimately 
constitutes the field of analysis (i.e. the organisations and social actors) as overdetermined by 
political rhetoric and government strategies that exist for the purpose of aligning government 
with neo-liberal economics. Not only do the empirical realities of diversity and complexity 
challenge this construction, but as stated above, more just responses to youthful lawbreaking 
remain theoretically occluded as the only change that is possible is change that functions to 
extend the grip of government. The argument made towards the end of this article is that in 
order to delineate the conditions for a more just response to youth crime, a framework must 
be developed that is able to move beyond logics of governmentality. The framework needs to 
takes in account the everyday lived realities of organisations and the actors that comprise 
them as well as the broader field of social relations between the penal and non-penal realms - 
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not just neo-liberal political strategy and rhetoric and/or the relationship between economic 
changes and problematics of government.  Perhaps most importantly, and as will be argued 
below, it will require a framework that is capable of theorising the relationships between 
social institutions (i.e. political, economic, social and ideological), bureaucratic organisations 
(i.e. Youth Justice Board, Ministry of Justice, youth offending teams, schools, police and so 
on) and social actors at various levels in those organisations, institutions and bureaucracies in 
a way which also is cognizant of their relative power. 
 
Against Youth Justice 
 
In contrast to the youth governance approach, there is a second dominant approach that one 
that does focus on the relationships between organisation in youth justice and government. 
For the purpose of this article, I will call it the ‘youth justice system’ approach.  Before 
describing it, a few comments might be helpful. First, unlike the youth governance approach, 
this perspective is not constituted by the application of theoretical models and concepts 
developed elsewhere and for other purposes. Second, in writing of a ‘youth justice system’ 
approach, I am making an analytical statement. The approach or perspective described below 
is formed by a set of conceptual assumptions and lines of demarcation. Any specific study 
may only be based on some of them, rather than all of them. The youth justice system 
approach is, in short, a way of conceptualising how a range of studies have constituted a 
specific object of analysis.  
Constitutive of the youth justice system approach are the following conceptual 
assumptions. Firstly, youth justice is a system which, in effect, exists in isolation to other 
governmental systems (such as adult criminal justice or mainstream education, for instance) 
and can be examined in its own right but, as a system, is ultimately determined by 
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government policy and political and policy rhetoric (i.e. the rationalities and justifications 
made by policy makers and politicians). Or, to be more specific, a youth justice system 
approach is one that constitutes political rhetoric and governmentally determined 
performance targets as the determining factor shaping the actual bureaucracies, organisational 
configurations, occupations cultures, social actions of practitioners and the actual outcomes 
for young people. Secondly, it is also assumed that inasmuch as this system currently is 
characterised by punitiveness or irrationality (Goldson 2015), it also has the potential to 
become more caring and welfarist based if only the correct policies and political conditions 
could prevail. These assumptions can be seen in the how the following empirical observations 
have been explained. Since 2006, first time entrants [i.e. those young people entering the 
youth justice system for the first time] dropped substantially (see figure 1). The numbers of 
young people being incarcerated has also dropped by a dramatic amount (see figure 2).  
 
[Figures 1 & 2 about here] 
 
Many Youth Offending Teams have shrunk in size. Across England and Wales, there has been 
an expansion in the use of schemes that divert young people out of youth courts. Political 
rhetoric about youth crime seems to have cooled down (Loader and Sparks 2010).  
As stated above, the baseline conceptual assumption of a youth justice system 
approach is that the system can be analysed as a system. Therefore, the theoretical question 
that the above empirical observations prompts is how we can account for what appears to be a 
diminution of the youth justice realm. In keeping with the way in which the system has been 
conceptualised (as a reaction to political rhetoric and government targets and as a 
managerialist bureaucracy (see Pitts 2001)), the explanations are sought in relation to 
intended and unintended consequences of changes to government policies and managerialist 
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systems of audit and control. So, for instance, Morgan (2008, 2009) challenged the Youth 
Justice Board’s explanation that the dramatic drop in the numbers of first time entrants was a 
result of the success of early intervention schemes by arguing that it was more likely a result 
of the increased use of out-of-court summary disposal (such as penalty notices for disorder) 
particularly as it coincided with the change of emphasis regarding the offences brought to 
justice target. In a similar vein, Bateman (2006, 2011, 2012) in his various explorations of the 
trends in the numbers of young people being incarcerated in England and Wales posits that 
the cause is likely to be found in the combination of a changing political climate and the 
types of performance targets that are set. More recently and in relation to the massive drop in 
the numbers of first time entrants and young people in custody, Bateman (2014) made the 
case that it was the confluence of three main factors: that youth crime has dropped since 
2008, that youth crime and justice has been depoliticised in the face of the ideology of 
austerity and the Coalition government’s drive to cut public spending, and that the first time 
entrants target has had a genuine effect. More recently, Goldson (2015) has explained the rise 
and fall of rates of youth incarceration in relation to “the deliberate and calculated 
politicisation or depoliticisation of youth crime” (Goldson 2015:171). In order to make this 
case, Goldson describes the recent history of party political rhetoric about crime control and 
youth crime (as expressed in political manifestos), political constructions of young offenders 
and youth crime (as expressed in a variety of key political speeches) and political economic 
choices (especially in relation to choices made about public spending) . He demonstrates how 
a hardening of political climate in relation to youth crime and punishment led to an increase 
rates of incarceration. He also shows how a shift in political priorities and, in particular, the 
rise of austerity measures, is capable of producing a reduction in rates of incarceration.  
It is not my intention to challenge the veracity of these claims. All of them are 
compelling when taken on their own terms. Nor is it my intention to discuss in anything other 
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than passing the tautology of describing a system as being comprised of a political realm and 
then using that political realm to account for any observed changed. Rather my intention is to 
raise a set of conceptual issues.  Firstly, although a line of demarcation is drawn between 
policy (broadly speaking) and the youth justice system, there is little internal differentiation 
made about the system and its responses. Thus, policing of youth crime is not analytically 
distinguished from sentencing cultures of youth court magistrates or occupational cultures of 
youth offending team workers or from, for instance, the relative power of the Youth Justice 
Board in determining practitioners’ actions versus practitioners’ capacity to act in accordance 
with a set of professional ethics or politics. To put it another way, there is little or no attempt 
to distinguish how central government performance targets differentially impact local youth 
offending teams, the police, the Youth Justice Board, youth courts, or even local schools. This 
lack of internal differentiation at anything other than the most basic descriptive or empirical 
level forecloses space in which to examine the relative power and roles of the different 
organisations that comprise youth justice (as well as those formally sitting outside this realm), 
the agency of practitioners, and how contradictory bureaucratic and institutional priorities are 
resolved within specific dynamics of power. Instead, the system is reified.  
In constructing the new youth justice as a discrete system that can be theorised and 
analyzed as such, many commentaries and studies start by locating youth justice in its wider 
social and economic conditions only inasmuch as any specified wider conditions are also 
traceable within youth justice2. This enables questions to be asked about the characteristics of 
                                                          
2There are notable exceptions however, including recent work by Ros Fergusson (2013) looking at the 
links between the criminalisation of young people and youth unemployment as well as Muncie’s 
(1999) earlier attempts to analyze the wider ideological and political conditions that made the CDA 
1998 possible. 
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the system and how and in what ways it is unique or distinct from adult criminal justice or 
from previous or other ways of responding to youth crime. However, and at the same time, 
treating youth justice as though it is a coherent system and as though it has some type of 
monolithic character flattens the previously mentioned complex and highly diverse field of 
social relations, bureaucratic organisations, social actors and the ways in which power infuses 
these relations and treats youth justice as though it has an external reality to the one 
constituted in the process of theorisation. In short, it is as though there is something ‘out 
there’ called a youth justice system that can studied as such without acknowledgement of the 
relationship between the theoretical construction we as academics adopt and the empirical 
realities discussed. With that, the study of how we might deal with youthful lawbreaking 
becomes trapped within a ‘now-ism’ that brackets off fundamental change and thus forecloses 
the space in which to distinguish the conditions of possibility for change. At the level of 
politics, this translates to the assumption that the current institutional and organisational 
configuration will remain at least for the foreseeable future (such as, for instance, youth 
courts, youth offending teams, community punishments for young people) and that a critical 
point of political intervention concerns how to make that system more compassionate, more 
welfarist, more just, more child centred, more caring. To put it another way, the focus is 
limited to identifying the principles and performance targets that are capable of producing a 
more caring, compassionate or ethical criminal justice response because governmental policy 
and targets are seen as determining the shape and quality of the system. It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that critical youth criminologists have been calling for a youth justice 
system that is framed by and fulfils England’s and Wale’s obligations under the CRC or the 
UNHRC (see, for instance, Goldson 2006, Goldson and Muncie 2015) instead of, for 
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example, calling to abolish it altogether. In other words, once the system becomes the object 
of analysis, the politics that follows is necessarily a politics of reform.  
There is one other important point of theoretical closure to discuss, one which the 
youth justice system approach shares with the youth governance approach. The approach 
closes the space in which it is possible to glimpse the role that practitioners have to play in 
maintaining (or changing) the system. There is a lack of analytical demarcation made 
between on the one hand the actual bureaucracies, organisational configurations, occupational 
cultures that might comprise the system or the government targets and audit measures and on 
the other the social actions of the individuals youth justice workers. Apart from Souhami’s 
(2007, 2014), Canton and Eadie (2002), Baker (2005) and Field (2007) there have been few, 
if any, theoretically informed empirical investigations that have focused on youth justice 
occupational culture, youth justice practice or indeed the social relations between various 
levels of bureaucratic organisations (for instance, the youth justice board, youth courts and 
youth offending teams) even though it is now more than a decade since the CDA 1998 was 
passed. This lack of general delineation or demarcation is seen most clearly in the suggestion 
that one possible explanation for system contraction is growth of professional confidence to 
act differently (i.e. in non punitive ways) following governmental policy to reducing the 
performance targets and audit measures. The explanation runs: there has been an increased 
use of diversion because youth offending team workers and police are able to operate with 
more discretion now than before. Logically speaking, such an explanation only makes sense 
if part of that explanation also posits that youth offending team practitioners are working 
within a particular type of ethical and moral space such that their intention is to mitigate what 
are understood by practitioners as being the harms of penal repression of young people. In 
other words, giving practitioners increased discretion alone will not necessarily, in and of 
itself, create a less punitive outcome, system contraction or a more compassionate youth 
16 | P a g e  
justice response. Indeed, it could, under certain ideological and economic conditions create a 
more punitive outcome. For instance, if the dominant practitioner-based explanation for youth 
crime is moral pathology (i.e. some young people are morally inclined to commit crime and 
all that can be done is to exclude them from civil society) and the economic conditions 
facilitate an expansion of private youth custodial facilities which because of economy of 
scale means that the cost of incarceration is relatively cheap, then there is no logical reason 
why increased professional discretion would necessarily result in anything other than 
increased use of custody because those authoring pre-sentence reports to the court may well 
recommend custody far more often. In addition to the other theoretical closures described 
about, constituting youth justice as a system that is determined by policy and governmental 
targets necessarily forecloses the space in which to think about practitioners’ roles (and 
intentions) in bringing about institutional change.  
 
For a Critical Youth Penology  
 
The preceding sections made the case that, as currently constituted, the field of youth justice 
studies is not in rude health. The framework for scholarship and research is such that 
possibilities for the development of theory (and from that, of practice and policy (Hirst 1979)) 
have been shut down, are self-limiting and hugely pessimistic. The critical point of closure in 
both instances is seen most clearly in relation to the lack of analytical tools to address 
important questions raised by some of the recent changes in quantity and quality of the 
punishment of young people. Is it more just to respond to youthful lawbreaking through out 
of court diversion schemes? Do fewer first time entrants signify a move to a more (or less) 
just way of dealing with young people? Do the changes in the shape, size, structure of youth 
justice signify anything beyond small shifts in sentencing practices, multi-agency 
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relationships between police and youth offending teams and local authorities, or indeed any 
other aspect of the relations between (or even within) any of the formal organisations tasked 
with delivering our current penal responses to young people? Both analytical frameworks 
open the space to describe connections between law, government policies (including 
governmentally driven targets and performance indicators) and what we might call, for the 
moment, the field of youth justice. But, my argument is that they do so in a way that lacks 
explanatory power or, at times, vision. In the preceding sections, I have detailed and 
demonstrated how both frameworks close off the space to conceptualise change mainly 
because both proffer arguments that are ultimately based upon on a functionalising and 
teleological logic (most especially the youth governance perspective) and/or policy and 
political reductionism and determinism. In critiquing these perspectives for their policy and 
political determinism though, I am not suggesting that the state, government or politics is not 
relevant. Likewise to make the case that there is a connection between these two realms 
(state, government and politics and youth justice) is not the same as spelling out whether it is 
a necessary and/or causal connection. In any case, both of these approaches (claiming there is 
no connection and being unable to delineate the necessary or causal connection) over-
simplify the issue of imagining and analysing the conditions of possibility for fundamental 
change (i.e. a non-penal response).  
There is a further issue, however. Describing the relationships within this field is not 
the same as explaining them. To do that requires a theoretical perspective that locates the 
described relationships in their broader context of social relations (economic, ideological, 
political and social). So, the issue at the heart of this article: how can a theoretical space be 
opened in which it is possible to glimpse the conditions of possibility for change, such as 
responding to youthful lawbreaking in non-penal ways? To do so means thinking in 
fundamentally new ways about youth justice. The rest of this section makes the case that one 
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way to achieve this would be to develop a critical youth penality from a bricolage of concepts 
drawn from penality (as in the sociology of punishment), youth studies and critical 
criminology. The argument is made by addressing the following three questions: Why 
penality? Why critical? Why youth? 
 
Why Penality? 
 
The starting point for the development of a critical youth penality is to abandon the concept 
of youth justice altogether, if only because the concept will always and already be tied to its 
empirical referent i.e. state penal responses. Once that concept is abandoned, then it is 
possible to draw on the notion of penality as developed within the sociology of punishment. 
Here, the theoretical space is opened to define the field of study as the totality of those 
practices and social relations that make up the social phenomenon of the ‘punishment3’ of 
young people and to recognise that these social relations have their own conditions of 
existence. Such a field of studies is analytically distinguished from the social phenomenon of 
youth crime and should not be constituted as a negative response by the state to youthful 
lawbreaking (Garland and Young 1983).  
Having defined the object of analysis as the practices and social phenomena of 
‘punishment’, or what might be called the youth penal realm, it is not to see it as a coherent 
singularity (Garland 1983). As discussed above, it is comprised of different institutions, 
organisations, practices and relations - all of which are supported by any number of agencies 
                                                          
3 One of the original lines of demarcation drawn within the sociology of punishment is between ‘penology’ and 
‘penality’ wherein ‘penology’ refers to the study of the justifications and philosophies of punishment (such 
as rehabilitation, retributivism, deterrence and so on) alongside the study of the techniques of punishment 
(see Carlen and Collison 1980 and Garland and Young 1983). As I use the term penality and punishment in 
the rest of this article, I am drawing the same distinction.  
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and wherein a variety of discourses circulate about intervention, about children, families, 
morality, community, authority, gender, poverty and so on. And, each of these organisations 
and agencies (youth offending teams, youth courts, children’s homes, secure units, social 
work teams, schools, families) are all located within their own material contexts – meaning 
that they have different capacities to access economic, legal, political or other types of 
resources to produce a penal (or social) effect. Whilst the youth governance and the youth 
justice system frameworks for analysis have opened the space to think through the various 
ways in which governmental objectives impact specific practices, by shifting the object of 
analysis to the youth penal realm the space is opened to see the types of control and power 
that operate across different institutions and agencies (state, local authorities, youth offending 
teams, courts, youth justice board, education, social services and so on) wherein the 
objectives are tensioned against each other and to what effect.  
It should be clear from the preceding paragraphs that in order to develop an analysis 
of the conditions of possibility for change, it is desirable to analyse the conditions of 
possibility for the current configuration. Some of that analysis will be empirical (see for 
instance Armitage, Kelly and Phoenix forthcoming). So, the answer to ‘why penality’ is that 
the concept permits the analytical focus to be shifted away from young people, the system 
and state responses to youth crime and takes as the primary object of analysis what might be 
called ‘the power to punish’ young people. So the call is for a critical youth penality in order 
to, precisely, open that space in which it is possible to theorise, analyse and investigate not 
just specific practices of punishment (Youth Rehabilitation Order, diversion schemes, 
restorative justice orders and so on) but why and how those practices (and the punishment of 
young people) takes the form that that they do and no other form. 
 
Why critical? Why youth? 
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Logically speaking, in order to imagine a non-penal or indeed even a more just response to 
youth crime and/or young people in trouble with the law, there first has to be frame of 
reference in which it is possible to articulate the unjust nature of contemporary responses. In 
keeping with penality or critical criminology, a critical youth penality might begin with the 
domain assumption, borrowed from Carlen (2013), that in societies marked by profound 
material and cultural inequalities, the ideals of justice are not capable of being realised. Two 
of those ideals are simply expressed as: equal protection under the law and equal treatment by 
the law. This is a call for critical youth penality because the material conditions subverting 
these ideals of justice for young people and for adults are both fundamentally different and 
yet fundamentally similar. As with adults, those punished for their illegal misdeeds tend to be 
the already marginalised, as social processes of criminalisation occur with existing class 
based structural inequalities. Hence, it is those who commit crimes of the street rather than 
the suite that populate our penal realms (see Wacquant 2001) – even though, arguably, the 
crimes of the powerful have far more reaching effects on wider groups of people (e.g. 
especially environmental crime, state crime and white collar crime). ‘Youth’, however, is not 
merely an age category. It is also a category of social differentiation that brings with it 
structural inequalities of its own (see for instance Cote 2014) that then articulate with 
processes of victimisation and criminalisation. Hence, it could be argued that current 
responses to youthful lawbreaking are fundamentally unjust because they target the 
lawbreaking of young people already marginalised by class, gender and cultural inequalities 
whilst simultaneously practising a form of radical non-interventionism regarding the crimes, 
particularly of violence and gendered sexual violence, committed against them (see, for 
instance, accounts of the criminalisation of young girls and women who are being sexually 
exploited (Phoenix 2012)). In this regard, the state has abrogated its responsibilities to offer 
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equal protection under the law for their experiences of victimisation whilst disproportionately 
holding them to account for their illegal misdeeds (see also Carlen 1996 and the concept of 
asymmetrical citizenship in the context of youth homelessness).  
These dynamics of under-protection and over-policing occur on the basis of many 
forms of social inequality (ethnicity, culture, gender, age and so on) (see for instance Walklate 
1989). However, in relation to the penal realm specifically, age based material inequalities 
subvert the possibility of a just punishment being meaningful because young people are held 
to account (i.e. punished) for their actions when many of those actions are shaped by 
conditions over which, because they are still children in the legal sense and at times 
developmental sense, they are utterly unable to change or affect. The point I am making here 
is not new. It has been made on many occasions across many different jurisdictions (see also 
Feld 1997 and McDairmid 2013). Young people cannot change where they live in order to 
move to areas that are less heavily policed. They cannot leave Local Authority Care or 
abusive families in order to create a more stable life for themselves. They cannot claim 
economic benefits in order to support themselves in the face of poor schooling and youth 
unemployment. They have little or no choice about the circumstances in which they are 
raised, including their schooling and any informal exclusions from school they may 
experience. More fundamentally, they cannot vote for politicians whose political policies 
might address key issues shaping their lives, for instance, youth unemployment. Needless to 
say, they also cannot vote against political parties whose economic policies are based on high 
tuition fees for further and higher education and mass youth unemployment. 
 
If not punishment, then what? 
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As schematically suggested above, a critical youth penality would seem to provide the 
analytical frame of reference and the conceptual tools to see well beyond current political, 
institutional, organisational and social configurations of youth justice and currently 
configured relations between (broadly speaking) social justice, criminal justice and young 
people. It also provides the platform for a new youth penal politics because in recognising the 
conditions that shape the unjust nature of the youth penal realm, it is possible to deny that 
these conditions are necessary and from there it is possible to imagine what non-penal 
responses to youthful lawbreaking might be. Just as Carlen (1983) suggested in an early 
article looking at the right to punish, regulatory intervention need not be the same as 
punishment. Regulatory intervention can be compelled and can be experienced by those on 
the receiving end as punishing. A critical difference might be that the aim of regulatory 
intervention would not be penal. A world can be imagined in which regulatory interventions 
into youthful lawbreaking were founded on “the authoritative rectification of the particular 
social problems on which occasion and are occasioned by lawbreaking” (Carlen 1983:213) 
and carried out in truly democratically accountable (and not ‘expert’) ways. So, for instance, 
high levels of youth crime in areas of high unemployment and urban deprivation may, in the 
right circumstances, prompt public debate about urban and economic policy or even may 
prompt circumstances in which local and central government are held to account by panels of 
local community members for creating more economic or leisure opportunities for young 
people in the area as well as more mental health and drug and alcohol services (as well as 
more mental health or alcohol services if there were simply not enough in the area of deal 
with the numbers of young people experiencing difficulties). Of course, there are some very 
thorny conceptual, theoretical and political issues here. Not least of which is whether it is 
possible to distinguish those regulatory intervention which are mandatory (for instance, court 
ordered), which are individualised (for instance where a court may order a young lawbreaker 
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to a drug or alcohol rehabilitation centre), which may or may not be experienced as painful or 
harmful at the individual level from those forms of regulatory intervention which may do all 
these things but also seek to intervene in the conditions of marginalisation and 
criminalisation which result in youth people appearing in the youth courts to begin with. 
However, my purpose is not to answer these questions. My purpose is only to open the space 
in which a theoretically informed discussion might take place. In the end, the main point I am 
making is that once the spaces are opened up in which to analyse the complexity of the youth 
penal realm and explain  it, the critical imagination can be unlocked and from there new and 
different ways of dealing with youthful lawbreaking can be imagined and fought for.  
 
An inconclusive conclusion 
 
This article has argued that the tools that have been developed within the youth governance 
approach or youth criminology / youth justice studies flattens the complexity (and the 
specificity) of the social relations that make up the youth penal realm. They do this the 
service of theories of neo-liberal governmentality or managerialist bureaucracy and the result 
are just more stories about the burden of managerialism and audit for public sector workers in 
criminal justice, about how managerialism limits the capacity of the professional to foster, 
sustain and create the human relationships that are a necessary component of supporting 
young people in their process of transition to adulthood and/or the irrationality of government 
approaches to young people.  This is mostly because, in constituting the field of study as 
either governmentality or the youth justice system each approach remains wedded to official 
governmental rhetoric and youth justice policy. Neither approach allows for a space to be 
opened in which it is possible to think beyond contemporary institutional and organisational 
configurations of youth justice.  
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It is the contention of this article that what is needed is a conceptual framework that 
distinguishes the specific practices of punishing young people (incarceration, diversion, 
community punishment – any of which can be more or less caring, compassionate, humane, 
mindful of the welfare of children) from the social conditions that make possible the 
punishment of an already marginalised, literally disenfranchised and often disproportionately 
victimised community. For, it is only when the analytical gaze is shifted to a more ambitious 
as well as more fully social and material analysis of why punishment (of young people) takes 
the shape that it does, that we can begin to glimpse whether fundamental change is taking 
place now (in relation to the dramatic decline of first time entrants and the numbers of young 
people on custody) as well as distinguish the conditions that would lead to a more just 
response. So, to provoke: a critical youth penality opens the space for an analysis of penal 
responses to young people (whether those are community based or custodial) within their 
broader social, ideological, economic, political and importantly organisational context 
without reducing each of these contexts to either political rhetoric or the specific ways that 
youth punishment is organised. Perhaps it is time to develop a critical youth penality in order 
to call time on youth justice, first in conceptual terms and then politically.  
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* Provisional data 
Source: Youth Custody Report April 2014 (MoJ, 12th April 2013) 
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